With the current emphasis on reducing defense budgets and a smaller military force improved through enhancements and selected modernizations, perhaps the Department of the Navy should pursue Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicle retirement and Landing Craft Utility (LCU) enhancement.
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"The history of warfare shows that the basic strategic asset of sea-based peoples is amphibious flexibility. In tackling land-based opponents, they can produce a distraction to the enemy's power of concentration that is advantageously disproportionate to the scale of force they employ and the resources they possess." 1 In 1992, the Department of the Navy, shifted its strategy from a focus on a global threat to a strategy focusing on regional challenges and opportunities. The strategy "...From the Sea" moved the naval services away from operations on the sea toward power projection and employment of naval forces from the sea to influence events in the littoral regions of the world --those areas adjacent to the oceans and seas that are within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces.
2 Two years later, the strategy was updated and expanded addressing specifically the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, in responding to crises, and in regional conflicts. This latest strategy, "FORWARD …From the Sea", incorporates not only a larger field of operations across the spectrum of conflict, it emphasizes conducting missions around the globe with a smaller, restructured force improved though enhancements and selected modernizations --a force fully prepared for the challenges of a new era. The importance of this new emphasis becomes clear when looking at the terrain of many littoral countries. With few roads, usually of poor quality, a sea borne force is often more mobile than a land force. Here the amphibious capability of our naval forces and the sea borne mobility they provide are well suited to the tasking. It can shift its main focus faster than the defense ashore can react, providing an operational mobility. 3 Additionally, as today's weapons increase in killing power, the urgency to move troops into areas of conflict with more speed and stealth is increased. The means to ferry troops ashore, or maneuver them once deployed, may prove critical to mission success. 4 The scope of this paper is to conduct an analytical study of the capabilitites, employment, and costs of the Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) vehicle and the Landing Craft Utility (LCU). With today's emphasis on a smaller force improved through enhancements and selected modernization, the focus of analysis will center on answering the question --Should the Department of the Navy pursue LCAC "retirement" and LCU enhancment? In order to make that determination, it is necessary to examine the capabilities each craft brings to today's naval forces and the future enhancements being considered. The study will conclude by examining some of the reasons why LCAC retirement could be considered.
Concept of Operations
The amphibious operation has historically been the most difficult of all military operations to execute. It may even be more so today. The traditional technique of conducting amphibious landings into the teeth of the enemy strength during daylight is being superseded, mandated by the mismatch between reduced sea-based fire support and the standoff defenses of potential foes. The emphasis has shifted from massive daylight assaults against heavily defended beaches to stealth, speed, and nighttime launches. The concept is to land where the enemy isn't;
hit facilities and accesses critical to reaching the designated assault area; quickly build up combat power ashore; seize key inland targets; and after repulsing or avoiding the expected counterattack, press on with the mission. With mobility and surprise an expeditionary force can succeed where it otherwise might have failed with massed troops and a costly frontal assault.
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In the past, maneuver-at-sea was separated from maneuver-on-land by a slower ship-toshore movement conducted by the landing force, in essence producing a seam on the battlefield.
Future maritime power projection ashore will be a continuous maneuver from the rearward naval base of embarkation to the ultimate objective, without stopping at the shoreline to regroup. 6 Using the Marine Corps employment concept "Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS),"
the final approach to the objective --a previously unheard of distance of as much as 200 nautical miles --may be accomplished under the cover of darkness. 7 Marine-Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) elements will launch from far out at sea and be transported to widely dispersed locations. This will make it much easier to achieve surprise, avoid the threat of sea mines, and confuse the enemy. To fully exploit the LCAC mobility, the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander, Landing Force (CLF) will need to plan for landing at one of several locations, possibly deferring the final decision on the penetration point(s) until after the landing force is well on its way toward the shore. This process demands accurate, timely intelligence about the location and movement of enemy units at several potential landing sites, as well as information on the beaches themselves. At the same time, naval forces will retain maximum flexibility for the insertion of subsequent waves --the landing force will not be committed to a single beachhead or landing zone. Finally, there will not necessarily be a requirement to quickly seize ports or airfields to accommodate follow-on forces, thus allowing the landing force to avoid dangerous urban areas. 8 Maneuvering from ship and crossing the shoreline to the objective without stopping will result in an overall seamless maneuver by the expeditionary force. Second, LCAC is capable of transitioning inland beyond the shoreline. Ashore it can maneuver to a secure, dry landing zone, rapidly off load, and quickly return to its support ship for follow on serials. Third, LCAC provides the ability to hit more targets and build up combat power ashore faster. Fourth, the use of LCAC can force the enemy to disperse forces or commit more of them to coastal defense. And finally, LCAC allows expeditionary forces to operate within the reaction cycle of the enemy --act faster and more decisively than the enemy forces, upsetting their balance.
LCAC Operations:
A key to LCAC is not only its speed, but the ease with which it can be loaded. The amphibious lift ship does not have to ballast or deballast to embark LCAC. This allows loads to be staged in the well deck between LCAC runs. Because of its drive-through capability --the LCAC has bow and stern ramps, allowing several craft to be loaded simultaneously --two LCAC can be quickly reloaded and launched in the time it takes to ballast and deballast for one LCU. Another benefit of LCAC is its ability to be refueled while the craft are being reloaded.
LCAC operations are far less labor-intensive and tactically restrictive for the support ship. LCAC are easily launched and recovered under way in open seas up to seastate three --an average wave height of five feet --allowing the ship freedom to maneuver. The Condition 1-A watchbill for LCAC operations is far more manageable than the one for receiving conventional landing craft. Launching or recovering displacement-hulled craft require more than 30 linehandlers and petty officers; several LCAC can be handled by a well deck control officer, a well deck safety observer/officer in charge, and one or two ramp marshalls who actually direct the LCAC in and out of the proper spots in the well. 9 Because the LCAC can make a rapid turnaround after a run to the beach, the personnel savings gained from not having to provide linehandlers provides the sizeable deck force needed to direct vehicles and handle cargo, exploiting the LCAC speed. Additionally, the similarity between LCAC and helicopter operations provides the naval forces an added bonus. Conducting simultaneous flight and welldeck operations is remarkably easy, and the flexibility and speed of offload using helicopters and LCAC is a great benefit.
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For a notional Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with five tanks and one battery of six howitzers, four LCAC would be sufficient to move all the tanks and artillery to the beach, each LCAC completing two round trips between ship and shore --approximately 2 hours total elapsed time. Only 15 LCACs would be required to land the MEF(FWD)'s 17 tanks and three artillery batteries with their prime movers, assuming a fourth artillery battery is taken ashore by helicopter.
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Operationally, LCAC are not used in assault waves because of extreme vulnerability to shore defenses. Lightly armored, the LCAC presents a large radar, visual, and infared target, and will be particularly vulnerable as it slows to traverse the shoreline and stops to debark troops and cargo. The same is true for the LCU, but the LCAC has a significant degree of redundancy in its construction. It was designed to operate on cushion, even with a significant amount of damage to its rubber skirt and the loss of much of its propulsion plant. Its survivability lies in its ability to hit a wide range of beaches at high speed with little warning. 12 Although no more vulnerable than conventional landing craft, and able to operate with significant damage before being put out of commission, its value requires that LCAC cushion landing zones (CLZs) be secured before the vehicle crosses the beach.
A frequent criticism is the LCAC small payload of 60 tons. However, the LCAC speed and turn-around time between runs to the beach diminish any such criticism. The criticism against the LCAC because of its inability to carry large numbers of combat troops will be nulllified with the recent development and testing of the Personnel Transport Module (PTM).
Facts, capabilities and criticisms aside, how has the LCAC been evaluated by on-scene commanders? Since 1990, the LCAC has firmly established its place in Marine expeditionary operations and opened the door for the use of the craft as part of a mobile riverine force.
Although capability, vulnerability, and maintainability of LCAC were seriously questioned in its early days, its performance in Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Operation Sea Angel and operations in Somalia has earned it an outstanding reputation for reliability and overall capability.
Lieutenant General Boomer, the Marine Component Commander during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, summed it up best, "How did the LCAC perform during Desert Storm? In a word, superbly. They performed with 100 percent reliability. Marines came away from that campaign feeling that our cost and time invested in the landing craft air cushion had been truly vindicated." 13 Major General Jenkins, the commander of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade during the same period, said the following about the LCAC: "We used it during day and night transport, for the assault echelon, for logistics, for raids --it came into its own during our operations in the Persian Gulf region. We didn't have to land in Kuwait because our presence and our capability to strike at a wide choice of locations, at a time of our choosing, fixed Iraqi forces along the coast enabling I MEF to destroy them from the rear." 14 In Bangladesh, during Operation Sea Angel, operating conditions were extremely difficult. Shallow tributaries, extremely high tides, and strong currents made conventional landing craft almost useless, but not the LCAC. Four LCAC handled the bulk distribution of food and medical supplies to the devastated area, delivering 1526 tons to the outlying areas.
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LCU Capabilities and Limitations: Long considered the work horse of amphibious operations, the LCU has long provided the heavy lift requirements for ship-to-shore maneuver. With its 180 ton lift capability, it has carried everything from three tanks to hundreds of troops in exercises and operations for over three decades. However, the LCU have only a limited ability to employ tactical surprise, for three basic reasons. First, they are restricted to those beaches that are hydrographically suitable for landing --this limitation also applies to amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) and mechanized craft (LCM-8s). This restriction helps the enemy commander identify the most likely avenues of approach and plan defenses to counter the assault. In effect it allows the enemy command and control element to identify a potential critical vulnerability for exploitation against friendly forces. Second, the slow moving assault craft must be launched relatively close to the beach to simplify their navigation for control purposes, minimize transit time to the boat lanes, and as a matter of general safety. This requirement alone precludes achieving the element of surprise. At a minimum, two to four hours will elapse from the initial appearance of the amphibious task force on the horizon until the landing of the first units at Hhour. The third limit is the predictability of any large-scale assault. Ports and airfields near the coastline have been almost mandatory objectives of the assault force, allowing the enemy commander to predict with a fair degree of certainty which area to strongly defend.
Future LCAC Enhancements.
Developments for the future use of LCAC have already begun.
In addition to various logistics concepts of employment, four areas of enhancement currently being considered concern: mine warfare, increased troop lift capability, patrol boat or antiaircraft picket boat, and Forward Arming Refueling Point.
-Mine warfare. Previous methods to clear mines from a landing area have included the use of Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams and mine sweep ships. Both options have denied the element of surprise to the landing forces. To ensure access to a mined landing beach or coastal approach while preserving tactical surprise, a method of rapid shallow-water mine clearance is required, one that essentially plows a cleared lane through the surf zone and any suspected land mines on the beach. Potential means include line charges, naval gunfire, or air strikes. LCAC testing to support this effort has included launching weighted line charges from the leading LCAC as they approach the beach. The line charge falls across the mined area and detonates the mines before assault waves pass through. A second method of mine clearance is the towed sled currently used by MH-53E helicopter squadrons. Modular mine counter-measures deployment packages have been acquired and successfully tested with the LCAC. 16 However, the cost of this second option for mine clearance by LCAC has proved as costly as deploying either conventional surface or aviation mine sweep assets. Therefore, the probability of further development and deployment of the mine countermeasures deployment package is doubtful. To apply gas turbine technology would require a new, lighter design, which, based on current research and acquisition processes, would mean delivery to the fleet sometime around the year 2010. However, a gas turbine propelled LCU would still not be as versatile as the LCAC. It still would be limited by the same factors that affect the current inventory of LCU --beach hydrography and surf conditions.
Why Consider LCAC Retirement?
The facts seem to point toward a greater utilization of the LCAC instead of less. Why then consider retirement of the newer LCAC technology and enhancement of the older LCU technology? Although not advocating LCAC retirement, Lieutenant General Boomer stated the following when discussing future defense spending and force structure, "One thing is clear in the debate at this point: the forces we retain will be smaller; they must be highly capable and relevant to the new world order; they must be useful over a wide spectrum of contingencies; and finally they must be affordable."
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The LCAC was developed during an era of defense build-up --a period when the United
States faced a vastly different national threat. We have entered a new era of naval warfare and face a multitude of uncertrain threats, primarily in the low to mid-intensity areas of the spectrum of conflict. Additionally, this new era encompasses the arena of peace-keeping operations and humanitarian assistance, which offer greater opportunity for unopposed entry versus the conventional opposed entry associated with high-intensity conflict and amphibious assaults.
Such a shift in concept of operations could be argued as reducing the requirement for speed, over-the-horizon approach, and increased beach access provided by the LCAC. Compounding the debate is the fact that the total number of amphibious ships is down from a high of 67 ships in the mid-1980s to 36 ships in 1995. Half of the ships in the 1980s were not capable of carrying either the LCAC or the LCU; today's inventory of amphibious ships is capable of carrying one or both of the craft. However, with the decommissioning of the LST-1189 class of ships, the dedicated asset for carrying the AAV tracked vehicles has also been lost.
These assault wave units will now be competing for deck space against the LCAC and LCU.
This also means that now a well deck asset from the ARG will have to maneuver closer to the shoreline in order to launch the AAV. This requirement will place a significant multi-purpose asset, normally one third of the ARG, within enemy shore defense range.
What can be gained by retiring the LCAC?
The gains that can be achieved by retiring LCAC and returning to use of the LCU as the primary landing craft fall into three categories: cargo/personnel lift, range, and reduced costs.
The LCU has the capability to lift 180 tons of cargo while the LCAC is rated at 60 tons (75 tons overload rate). The thirty-four LCU have a total lift capacity of 6120 tons of cargo.
Ninety LCAC have a total regular lift capacity of 5400 tons; at the rated overload capacity the The third significant loss is flexibility. With its ability to maneuver on the beach, the LCAC can move ashore, turn around to the direction best suited to offload, and then debark its cargo. With its fore and aft ramps, equipment can drive in and drive off the LCAC; the landing force equipment does not have to be specially placed in order to back into the cargo area as is the case with the LCU. The ability to maneuver on the beach also saves wear and tear on the landing force equipment since it does not have to drive through the surf zone, suffering the detrimental effects of saltwater. The LCAC ability to position anywhere on the beach, as opposed to the confines of the designated beach lanes, also reduces the congestion associated with establishing a beachhead. As to vulnerability near the beach, the fact that the LCAC rides on a cushion of air, coupled with its speed and maneuverability, provides the landing force as great a degree, if not greater, of flexibility and survivability. It is hard to believe that a conventional landing craft or amphibious personnel carrier waddling into a limited beachfront at five to ten knots is less vulnerable than a 40 knot LCAC. Additionally, the LCAC can be refueled while being loaded.
The LCU will refuel either alongside an assigned ship or in the welldeck; in either case, loading must stop until refueling is complete. And finally, ships conducting LCAC operations can simultaneously conduct flight operations. Ships operating with LCU must delay or secure flight operations while conducting wet well operations. At a minimum, this is a loss of two hours --30 minutes to ballast down and receive the LCU, up to 60 minutes to load the LCU, and another 30 minutes to debark the LCU and deballast.
CONCLUSION.
The LCAC lift capacity, coupled with its speed and maneuverability, provides a mobility package that gives even more speed and power to the Marine-Air-Ground Task
Force's (MAGTF) punch. It promises to keep the MAGTF at the center of the military's power projection mission well into the 21st century. When you combine the LCAC with the AAAV and V-22, "you put at risk just about any hunk of littoral anywhere around the world." 21 Together, the LCAC and LCU represent a potent force and cargo moving capability of the amphibious forces. There is a need to retain the individual capabilities of each craft. The LCAC is ideally suited to put forces ashore when and where the ATF commanders want within the concepts of OMFTS and can reach coastal areas that need supplies but are inaccessible to conventional landing craft. Although slower, the LCU can carry more cargo; its only real limitation is depth of water. As long as beach gradients support their landing, LCU have a position in the assault echelons, while LCAC either cross the beach through secured zones or transport forces in an envelopment maneuver. For peacekeeping, civil emergency, and humanitarian operations, where the ATF can maneuver closer to the beach, the LCAC can provide depth and speed in maneuvering to remote areas, and the LCU can provide heavy lift via supporting beaches or port facilities. The one thing the LCU can not do, regardless of enhancement packages developed, is replace the speed and mobility capabilities of the LCAC.
The investment in LCAC has been made; they have proven their value to today's naval expeditionary forces. Despite the heavy cost in maintaining and operating LCAC, now is not the time to be considering retirement. Power projection, a key function of "FORWARD...From the Sea," is where the LCAC has made, and will continue to make, the doctrine to prepare the naval service for the 21st century a reality.
